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ABSTRACT 
 
Labor management co-operation is a perennial issue in British industrial relations research.  Recent 
interest has focused upon workplace ‘partnership’ agreements, which have been a key plank of the 
New Labour government’s employment policy of ‘modernisation’ (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).   
Although the European language of social partnership does not have an exact equivalent in the US 
literature, Kelly (2004) suggests that “the phrase ‘labor management co-operation for mutual gains’ 
comes closest in meaning (p.268).  The term partnership remains notoriously ambiguous (Guest and 
Peccei, 2001; Terry, 2003), though most would agree that it concerns an attempt to shift the culture of 
employment relations away from zero-sum and adversarial relationships, towards co-operative 
employment relations, characterised by mutual trust and ultimately mutual gains (Stuart and Martinez-
Lucio, 2004). 
 
Much of the literature has focused on whether partnership offers a valuable opportunity for the 
beleaguered trade union movement (Terry, 2003), and the extent to which it delivers mutual gains. 
Empirical evidence is mixed, though the most recent empirical studies have been critical in tone (Stuart 
and Martinez-Lucio, 2004), suggesting that – despite the mutual gains rhetoric - the ‘balance of 
advantage’ is often skewed in favour of management (Guest and Peccei, 2001). 
 
This paper presents the findings of a three-year research study conducted in the British financial service 
sector.  Case studies were conducted in three diverse banking organisations, known as Nat Bank, Bu 
Soc and Web Bank.  
 
It is suggested that, in order to transcend the current polarised debate on mutual gains, it is important to 
reconsider what partnership is expected to achieve.  Existing research has tended to focus on the 
labor/union outcomes of partnership, while a key aim of this study was to examine the way issues were 
handled, and how decision decisions are made, drawing upon the analytical framework proposed by 
Budd (2004). It asks to what extent partnership contributes to the moderation/accommodation of the 
competing employment relations objectives of efficiency, equity and voice?  In this way, the study 
avoids the crude use of labor outcomes – such as job losses or pay levels – as simple indicators of the 
success or otherwise of partnership working.  It is argued that, when judged in this light, partnership 
working can be seen to demonstrate more than a modicum of success in contributing to the regulation 
of the employment relationship.  
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LABOUR MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION AND THE ‘PARTNERSHIP 
PHENOMENON’ 
 
 
Partnership is a noteworthy development in Britain under the Blair government.  In 
1998 Blair suggested how “modern and successful companies draw their successes 
from the existence and development of partnership at work” (DTI, 1998).  Partnership 
has since attracted significant interest from practitioners, unions and policymakers 
alike.  Ackers et.al (2004) suggest that the current period of ‘social partnership’ may 
be described as a distinctive phase with its own dynamics.  Now, during a third term 
of Labour government the term remains ambiguous as ever, meaning all things to all 
people (Ackers et.al, 2004; Heery et.al, 2004). Indeed, Oxenbridge and Brown (2004) 
prefer to use the term “collaborative union/employer relationship”, suggesting that 
the term partnership “has become too diffuse to carry much meaning”.  Others have 
suggested that “we need to leave the term partnership to the politicians” (Stuart and 
Martinez-Lucio, 2004, 422).   
 
Disagreement regarding what workplace partnership means in the British context 
notwithstanding, most commentators agree that partnership concerns an attempt to 
shift away from adversarial relationships towards more co-operative, high trust 
relations and mutual gains.  In this sense, it resonates with the US notions of ‘labour 
management co-operation’ and ‘mutual gains’ (Kelly, 2004; Kochan and Osterman, 
1994).  Initially the focus appeared to be on forging partnerships between 
management and unions.  Lately, however, the debate has broadened to consider the 
possibility of different kinds of arrangements.  These include agreements in union and 
non-union environments, and formal or informal arrangements (see for example 
Badigannavar and Kelly, 2003; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Stuart and Martinez-
Lucio, 2004). 
 
Despite an abundance of research studies, the main debate in the academic literature 
centres around the impact of partnership on trade union renewal (Terry and Smith, 
2003).  For Ackers and Payne (1998) “partnership offers British unions a strategy 
that is not only capable of moving with the times and accommodating new political 
developments, but allowing them a hand in shaping their own destiny”.  Some 
commentators, however, have remained decidedly sceptical.  Radical commentators 
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object to partnership as a matter of principle, arguing that such a relationship is of 
meretricious value, and will inevitably lead to an imbalanced situation with negligible 
benefits for unions or their members, but leading instead to emasculation, 
marginalisation and incorporation (Kelly, 2004). The British business environment 
and structure of corporate governance focuses heavily on short-term financial 
performance, meaning there is little incentive to engage in genuine long-term 
partnerships (Deakin et.al, 2004; Heery et.al, 2002), in the same way as there may be 
in a co-ordinated market economy such as Germany. This raises the issue of the 
distinctive British institutional context.  The debate remains starkly polarised as ever 
and the two quotes below usefully illustrate the divergent viewpoints.    While 
Danford et.al (2004) argue that militant unionism is the best approach for unions, 
Ackers et.al (2004) do not view militancy as a viable option, and suggest unions need 
to engage in co-operative partnerships: 
 
“Partnership does not negate Kelly’s militant unionism, it demands it…high performance 
work systems and partnership do not resolve the structural antagonism between capital and 
labour” (Danford et.al, 2004, 186). 
 
“It may be partnership or perish and even then it  may not be easy for unions” (Ackers et.al, 
2004, 29).  
 
More recently, studies have begun to identify a continuum of potential employment 
relations outcomes, arguing that the consequences are much less black-and-white than 
the polarised advocates/critics debate implies.  Clearly, the outcomes are likely to be 
linked to the nature of the specific agreements, rationale, context, business 
environment, day-to-day processes, and relationships within organisations espousing 
partnership, rather than the actual text of an agreement (Dietz, 2004).  In this sense, 
the critical literature is perhaps unduly deterministic.  Accordingly, there is evidence 
to suggest that the exact nature of the processes described under the ‘partnership’ 
umbrella vary considerably, and different trajectories of experience are possible.   For 
example, Kelly (2004) identifies ‘labour-parity’ and ‘employer-dominant’ 
agreements.  He describes the former as marked by a balance of power towards an 
agenda of labour compliance and the latter as a more balanced relationship.  Wray 
(2004) draws a distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘counterfeit’ agreements.  Research 
by Oxenbridge and Brown also (2004) makes a distinction between ‘nurturing’ 
agreements where relationships are informal and unionisation is normally high, and 
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‘containing’ agreements, where restrictive formal agreements appear to accord 
minimal rights and limit influence.   
 
There are several limitations of the current research.  Firstly, there is the issue of 
sector.  It is noteworthy that many of the pessimistic studies have been conducted in 
traditional but declining sectors, whereas others conducted in more buoyant sectors 
have been more optimistic.  Secondly, definitional ambiguity raises the possibility 
that researchers are actually comparing very different situations despite a common 
organisational rhetorical commitment to partnership in some way.  Indeed, a key 
assumption in the research is that it is easy to distinguish between ‘partnership’ and 
‘non-partnership’ organisations when clearly this is not the case.  The debate is also 
politically charged and the political and ideological leanings of individual researchers 
cannot be ruled out. 
 
Empirical research advances the debate but beneath the surface and differences 
of interpretation are more fundamental ideological/theoretical 
controversies about the nature of modern society. This applies equally to 
discussions of partnership, where IR frames of reference (Fox, 1974) are 
particularly evident on all sides. For if you are a Marxist and believe that 
capitalism is mainly about exploitation and conflict 
of interests, you are likely to be much more suspicious of co-operation than 
a Pluralist or a Unitarist -and vice versa.    This leads to the final, and arguably most 
important proposition, that there is a need to re-consider the various benchmarks for 
success used, and how one evaluates the success or otherwise of partnership, and 
much depends upon one how views the employment relationship.  For example, some 
of the critical literature provides redundancy statistics as ‘evidence’ of the ‘failure’ of 
partnership.  Kelly (2004) for example investigates profit margins, wage rates and 
working hours between partnership and non-partnership firms.  Yet as Dietz makes 
clear: “One need not express surprise when large scale redundancies take place under 
partnership.  The issue is how they are agreed upon and handled (Dietz, 2004,6, 
emphasis added).  
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A similar point has been made by Martinez-Lucio and Stuart who argue that: 
 
“The study of partnership requires an approach that is sensitive to internal processes of 
decision-making, and the rationales that underpin the elaboration of strategies regarding 
work” (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2000, 21). 
 
In short, there is a need to reconsider how we actually evaluate the process and 
outcomes of partnership.  A potentially useful framework is that provided by Budd 
(Budd, 2004).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budd argues that the objective of the employment relationship is to achieve some kind 
of balance between efficiency, equity and voice, and that extreme positions are both 
undesirable and untenable.  He suggests that while economic performance is clearly 
important, this has to be balanced with ‘equity’ defined as fair employment standards 
and treatment, and ‘voice’, defined as meaningful input into decisions.  It is often 
suggested that in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the balance is often tipped in favour of 
efficiency, over issues of voice and equity. This can be contrasted with the 
environment of other European countries including Germany and Sweden where a 
history of social democratic politics have ensured stronger countervailing pressures of 
voice and equity.  The UK model  has been criticised on the grounds that since the 
Voice 
 
Efficiency             Equity 
Figure 1 – Efficiency, equity and 
voice 
Source: Budd (2004, 30)
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election of the Thatcher government in 1979, the focus has been on economic 
efficiency at the expense of equity and voice, resulting in a “representation gap” 
(Towers, 1997).  Since 1997, a combination of the New Labour government and 
increased European regulation has shifted the balance back slightly through, for 
example the National Minimum Wage and Information and Consultation Directive. 
 
Budd argues employment research should be rooted in the three objectives of the 
employment relationship.  This framework has not been used in British employment 
relations research, yet Budd suggests that “they provide the dimensions for evaluating 
social partnerships” (Budd, 2004, 120).  Accordingly, this paper examines if and how 
partnership contributes to the balancing of the countervailing pressures of efficiency, 
equity and voice  in the case of three UK banking organisations referred to as 
NatBank, BuSoc, and WebBank. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The paper presents data from three case studies conducted in the UK financial service 
sector.   The bulk of data is based upon semi-structured interviews with a range of 
managers, trade union representatives and employees.  A key aim of the interviews 
was to explore respondent views and perceptions of the way specific issues had been 
handled in detail, as opposed to a more general discussion of employment relations.  
A particular aim was to mitigate the tendency of respondents to base their assessments 
based upon their most recent experiences, and to consider examples over an extended 
time period.  It is also important to note that the research focused upon large back-
office administration/customer service centres.  Interviewees include a range of union 
officials, union/employee representatives, and employee focus groups.   A deliberate 
aim was to interview different functional managers in order to gauge how 
employment relations issues were perceived in different parts of the organisation.  All 
interviews were approximately forty-five minutes long.  The interview data was 
supplemented by detailed examination of internal company literature where available 
including agreements, minutes, magazines etc. as well as news coverage of the 
organisation in the business press and trade magazines.   
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FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UK 
 
 
The financial service sector in the UK is interesting for both practical and academic 
reasons.  Firstly, there has been a significant increase in service sector employment 
generally, and in financial services specifically.  Indeed in 2001 financial and business 
services accounted for one in five jobs in the UK compared with around one in ten 
jobs in 1981.  This makes it the sector with the highest growth in these two decades, 
as part of the post-war growth in services and decline in manufacturing (ONS, 2002).  
The organisations under study are also highly profitable businesses.  NatBank for 
example,  has recently reported profits exceeding £4billion (£800 million in their card 
business which is the focus of the study).  Banking organisations also employ a 
significant number of female employees, part-time workers and young people.   In 
terms of the private sector, banking services is relatively highly unionised with 
aggregate density of 32% (Cully et.al, 1999).  From an academic perspective, 
relatively little is known about employment relations in the finance sector, and where 
attention is given to the area, it has tended to focus on issues surrounding call centre 
working and the labour process (see for example Taylor et.al, 2002; Bain et.al, 2002; 
Rose, 2002; Knights and McCabe, 2003; Taylor and Bain, 2001).  Notable exceptions 
include the work of Storey and colleagues in the 1990s (Storey, 1999, Storey, 1995, 
Storey et.al, 1997).  The sector is also interesting as the recognition of trade and staff 
unions in financial services can be traced back to the 1960s, and membership has been 
relatively robust.   The sector has also experienced intense competition and significant 
organisational change.  In turn employment policies have shifted towards 
performance-related pay, flexible working and the use of agency labour. Thus, it is 
argued that financial services sector represents an excellent indicator of contemporary 
British employment relations.     
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PARTNERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING 
 
It is proposed that a key test of partnership is whether  it actually changes the way 
decisions are made.  This section outlines the empirical evidence from the three case 
studies, by exploring decision making processes in each organisation, in relation to 
the countervailing pressures of efficiency and voice. 
 
 
1. NatBank 
 
NatBank is one of the ‘Big Four’ British banks.  The organisation signed a formal 
partnership agreement with its recognised trade union in 2000 following an extended 
period of fractious industrial relations throughout the 1990s.  As a large city 
institution, NatBank management made clear that efficiency was the primary 
objective and that ultimately the business is owned by shareholders who expect a 
return on their investment.  Indeed, during the 1990s industrial relations unrest was 
exacerbated by a loss of City confidence in the organisation.  However, since 
partnership, there was evidence to suggest that the business efficiency objective is 
being regulated  to some extent by the partnership mechanism.  For example, 
outsourcing to India for cost-saving reasons primarily through the use of cheaper 
labour (efficiency) was more equitable than it could have been without an agreed 
consultative framework.  The Bank has signed a ‘Globalisation Agreement’ outlining 
commitments regarding a fair and transparent process for the management of 
redundancy.   
 
NatBank also wanted all telephone staff to be encouraged to sell on calls, taking the 
efficiency view that call centres should be a profit centre rather than merely a cost 
centre but for many long-serving staff with little experience of telephony work, this 
was stressful and resulted in high turnover.  Following discussions with the union, the 
Bank reluctantly decided to re-introduce a customer service-only role, even though 
this countered their initial aim to maximise efficiency by having all call agents trying 
to sell on every call. The Employee Relations Manager suggested that the sales 
strategy represented a pure technical model which neglected the reality and dynamics 
of call centre working, and the fact that some people did not like and simply were not 
good at selling.  This also illustrates how a decision which was perceived to be 
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inequitable, had a negative impact on efficiency as turnover increased, suggesting a 
business case for equity also exists.  There are several call centres in the area and 
NatBank employees left to seek customer service-only roles at these organisations.  
Hailed as an example of successful decision-making through partnership, the 
Customer Service Director still believed that all agents should be selling, based on a 
unitarist view that by not selling they are not promoting the company and in turn 
potentially damaging their job security.  This relates to the worker/customer 
satisfaction mirror proposed in the new service management literature (Korcynski, 
2002).   
 
The Budd framework can also be used to examine a business idea to try and 
harmonise contracts from traditional 9-5 to staggered 8am-midnight pattern.  This 
made administrative sense because customers now expected to be able to call the bank 
at any time of the day, yet the core of long-serving staff only worked normal office 
hours.   The union successfully persuaded the Bank to leave long-serving staff on the 
old working hours should they so wish, by highlighting the potential damage to 
morale of long-serving staff if such a change was simply imposed (equity).  The Bank 
acknowledged that the negative impact of employee perceptions of inequity may 
counter or even outweigh the proposed administrative efficiencies of contract 
harmonisation.  This required the Bank to re-think and return to the main issue, that is, 
how they could staff telephones in the evening to match customer demand, and 
decided that the only way to do this was by recruiting a pool of new staff on new 
terms and conditions which match business demand.  This was not the ideal situation 
for the business, which would prefer all employees to work on such a pattern, and 
neither was it the ideal situation for the union.  The union took a pragmatic view, that 
is that they are there to protect fee-paying members first and foremost, and if that 
meant protecting them at the expense of new recruits then so be it.  The ER Manager 
suggested that following discussions the final decision made much more sense, and 
that there was no need to upset the existing experienced workforce, and that the 
shortfall could be bridged by recruiting new employees to cover the evening shifts.   
 
Another illustration of countervailing pressures is in the area of discipline and 
grievance.  Representatives suggested that pre-partnership there had been a macho 
hire-and-fire culture and a high level of formal disciplinary cases.  They proposed that 
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there was often evidence suggesting that a fair disciplinary process had not been 
followed, and the cases against employees would be dropped because line managers 
had not followed due process.  Representatives suggested that this is less common 
now as under partnership the agreed process to be followed is now much clearer.  
Again, the ER Manager suggested that having a transparent process had helped to 
reduce the arbitrary treatment of employees, and increasingly the resolution of 
disputes without recourse to formal procedures. 
 
Within NatBank, voice was a prominent issue.  The local union representatives were 
active, employees generally knew who their union representatives were and support 
for the union was strong.  Representatives had taken up their posts because they were 
keen to get involved in light of the high level of organisational change the 
organisation was encountering.  There is evidence, therefore, that at NatBank the 
partnership mechanism was moderating decision-making and mitigating the worst 
effects of organisational change on employees.  In terms of the Budd framework there 
was evidence to suggest that the union was able to promote equity as a countervailing 
pressure against pure business decisions based on a pure ‘efficiency’ logic.  There was 
also evidence to suggest a business case for equity, given that decisions which were 
perceived to be inequitable were often deemed to be inefficient due to the negative 
impact on morale, and the increase in attrition as dissatisfied staff chose to leave the 
organisation.  However, more equitable decisions appeared to represent an 
acknowledgement that a pure efficiency decision would not be in the business 
interest, as opposed to some moral imperative.  The countervailing pressures are 
outlined in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voice 
Efficiency             Equity 
Sales culture, 
Harmonisation, 
Flexibility, Off shoring 
Severance 
package, 
voluntary 
redundancy, 
status quo 
Figure 2 – Countervailing forces at 
NatBank 
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2. BuSoc 
 
The triad can also be used to evaluate partnership within BuSoc.  Though there is no 
formal union-management partnership agreement in this case, a history of co-
operative employment relations, and joint commitments to business success and 
employment security appeared indicative of a prima facie case of partnership.  
Management and union respondents also agreed the notion of partnership resonated 
with the style of management-union relations, although the term ‘partnership’ was not 
used.  As a mutual building society owned by members BuSoc does not have the same 
commercial pressures to satisfy the stock exchange.  This could be viewed as a fertile 
environment for partnership or conversely as a barrier, as it may mean there is less 
pressure to proactively engage with partnership, as such relationships have often 
arisen out of crisis.  BuSoc have used their historical image as a less ruthless and 
ethically guided institution to its advantage both in terms of consumer marketing and 
their espoused approach to employment relations.  Accordingly, compulsory 
redundancies at BuSoc are almost unknown, the Society has committed not to 
offshore functions abroad, and have invested in various pioneering schemes 
concerning work-life balance, domestic violence, home working and equal 
opportunities.  The HR Director suggested that they are proud of being voted best UK 
employer by a Sunday newspaper in 2005, and that normally their employment 
policies exceed the statutory minimum arrangements.  Union officials agreed that 
BuSoc employment policy typically exceeds statutory regulations, and in union 
recruitment literature cite this as evidence of their success. 
  
Yet management suggested that the organisation was risk-averse, and would normally 
settle tribunals out of court even if they believed they had a strong case, to avoid any 
potential damage to the ‘ethical’ brand image.  Again, this does not suggest that 
management decisions are necessarily the result of union pressure, and leads to the 
potential criticism in some cases that a focus on equity may actually be inefficient.  
This is not to suggest that there has not been conflict between the union and 
management in recent years.  Indeed, major disputes have occurred in relation to the 
end of the final salary pension scheme for new employees despite strong union 
opposition.  In this case, the efficiency force was clearly greater than the equity 
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concerns.  Union officials opined that despite their vehement opposition there was 
little they could do as the decision was not unlawful, and was simply presented to 
them as a fait accompli.  This occurred under the leadership of the previous Chief 
Executive who the Union General Secretary suggested was strongly efficiency 
focused.  He believed the current Chief Executive had a stronger interest in 
employment relations as well as financial performance.  The Union President held a 
similar point of view, suggesting that the current Chief Executive appeared to be more 
interested in people issues as well profits.  In this case, therefore, the attitudes of the 
personalities involved appeared to be central to the process, although the suggestion 
that major decisions such as pension arrangements can depend on the whim of the 
Chief Executive, and the relationship we has with union officials appears 
incompatible with the notion of partnership. 
 
Some examples were cited where the union and management had  worked together 
but this was mostly on a minority of relatively uncontroversial issues.  For example 
they jointly devised a new performance management framework which they thought 
was fairer for employees (equity) but clearly driven by a desire to improve employee 
performance, and in turn business performance (efficiency).  Moreover, in 2005 the 
union negotiated a record pay deal of which they were very proud, another example of 
where notions of equity have been a strong countervailing pressure on efficiency 
maximisation.  Union officials agreed that on balance BuSoc is a ‘good employer’, at 
least compared to competitors in the same sector, and this makes it difficult to assess 
the extent to which the union is actually making a difference.  On the other hand, 
managers suggested that a staff union was an effective medium suggesting that since 
most officials are former employees they can take a more balanced view of situations.  
In general terms, the equity pressure as a whole was more prominent at BuSoc than it 
was in the other case organisations, and this may have meant there was less need for 
the union to adopt a proactive stance as was the case at NatBank.  Moreover, within 
this context the grassroots employee interest in voice was lower.  Employees were 
apathetic and this apathy appeared to stem from satisfaction as opposed to 
disillusionment.  Staff attitude surveys are normally very positive, and focus group 
discussions confirmed this, with most employees viewing BuSoc as a good employer 
overall.  Where dissatisfaction did occur, this was attributed to problems of  
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implementation of local decision-making, rather than dissatisfaction with corporate 
policy itself.   
 
Union representatives were often inactive, and had often been nominated under 
duress.  Most of the negotiation and consultation occurred at a very senior level 
between Executives and one or two senior union officials.  Perhaps this is partly the 
case because senior union officials are the few people not employed by the Society, 
and therefore have less fear of retribution.  It is possibly  more difficult for seconded 
officials who are due to return to work after their time on union position to voice their 
true concerns, although if this was the case it would also be true in the case of 
WebBank.  BuSoc representatives had taken their roles often by default, and IR issues 
were not really of a day-to-day concern.  Employees suggested that they would 
probably take more interest in employment relations matters had there been more 
controversial incidents as in other organisations.  The union also speculated that while 
the Executive Board are committed to mutuality for the foreseeable future, they 
wondered what impact de-mutualisation would have, and how the employment 
relations climate may change.  It was proposed that the need to deliver results to stock 
exchange could have a negative impact on the employment relations culture.  While 
the employer was keen to promote an ‘ethical’ image, the union was keen to avoid 
any perception that they were ‘bought-in’ or co-opted.   
 
In sum, while the equity pressure appeared to be much stronger than at NatBank, there 
was little evidence to suggest that this was because of a partnership relationship 
between the union and management, and highlights the significant possibility that 
BuSoc may still be a good employer irrespective of the union.    For example, there 
was still evidence to suggest that when external forces did result in an efficiency 
‘crisis’, such as the problems funding the final salary pension scheme, the efficiency 
force would prevail over equity with minimum voice afforded to employees or the 
union.  Contrary to what may have been expected, there was little evidence of 
partnership contributing to the balance of efficiency, equity and voice at BuSoc.  The 
countervailing forces are outlined in Figure 3 below. 
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3. WebBank 
 
WebBank was set up in the 1990s with the aim of being different and ‘radical’ in the 
conservative UK banking market, offering competitive products aimed at young, 
educated and affluent consumers.  The company does not recognise a trade union, and 
in this context partnership concerns an in-house representative body known as the 
WebBank People Forum.  Management suggested that since the company was listed 
on the stock exchange two years after launch, the pressure to satisfy shareholders that 
WebBank is a satisfactory investment has had a significant impact on day-to-day 
operations (efficiency).  Despite a high degree of UK success, WebBank was a loss-
making business due to a combination of high start up costs but in particular the 
failure of their overseas expansion project.  The company was supported by the parent 
company, an international financial organisation, breaking into profit for the first time 
in 2005.  In terms of voice, WebBank decided to set up an internal Employee Forum 
in preference to recognising an external trade union.  It was suggested that 
management perceived unions to be too adversarial and at odds with the culture of a 
new organisation.  Only 5 years old, the Forum is still evolving but appears to be run 
very much on terms set by management, and the representatives and management 
were both clear of the fact that it is not a negotiating body.   Most of the 
representatives did not seem to have a problem with this role:  One did, however, 
Voice 
Efficiency             Equity 
End final 
salary 
pension 
scheme 
Opposed to offshoring 
Exceed statutory 
minimum requirements 
Paternalistic image 
Figure 3 – Countervailing forces at BuSoc
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express some doubts regarding the ability of the Forum to challenge in the face of 
severe adversity: 
 
“My vision of WBPF is that we need to be more challenging.  It’s all nice and lovely 
at the moment, but we are going to hit big things.  Big things will happen.  Can we 
challenge them successfully?  Do we have information to challenge…That’s my 
concern really.  You are doing this ‘business case’ and you are telling me you need to 
close this department down, can I see those figures?  And do those figures mean 
anything to me?” 
 
The existence or role of the Forum was not a priority for most employees.  Many had 
limited knowledge or interest in the Forum.  At most, it was considering to be a 
counselling service, offering advice in the event of discipline and grievance cases.  
However, as was the case with NatBank, there was some evidence of the Forum 
acting as some kind of efficiency-equity arbiter.  For example, the Forum challenged 
the arbitrary selection procedures being used to decide new posts following an IT 
restructure which they believed were initially based on personalities and friendships 
rather than competence.  The Forum is also active in ensuring that disciplinary and 
grievance procedures are followed in a fair way and that due process is followed 
(equity).  Overall though, on the efficiency-equity continuum WebBank would be 
much closer to efficiency than to equity as it was very much involvement on terms 
defined and controlled by management. Even where decisions were ostensibly made 
in relation to equity, this was often underpinned by sound business rationale.  For 
example, for a period the organisation was put up for sale by the parent organisation.   
Many employees had obvious concerns regarding their job security with the 
organisation should a takeover or merger occur.  WebBank offered employee £1000 
loyalty bonus in return for a commitment to stay with the organisation.  For some 
employees this was perceived to be recognition from a caring employer, but appears 
to be driven for business reasons, given that the organisation faced a potential exodus 
of experienced staff in light of the uncertainty.   
 
There was still the general appearance the representatives did not want to be seen to 
‘rock the boat’ too much, and this was the impression given by the Employee Chair 
who advocated a softly-softly approach.  Indeed, there was a sense of vulnerability 
given that the structure has no statutory protection and could be wound up at any time.  
As one senior manager reflected, “at some point, if they went off in a direction we 
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were totally unhappy with, we would have to deal with it”. Nevertheless, there was 
moderate evidence of the forum addressing the countervailing forces of efficiency, 
equity and voice, illustrated in Figure 4 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
By employing the analytical framework proposed by Budd (2004), there was evidence 
to suggest that as a result of voice and dialogue, union/ employee representatives were 
often able to moderate decisions to mitigate the worst effects for employees at 
NatBank and WebBank.  To illustrate, in Figure 5 management may have proposed an 
efficiency-oriented decision to make 100 compulsory redundancies (D1).  
Traditionally, the union may have opposed the redundancies on philosophical 
grounds.  However, at NatBank for example, the union and management team worked 
together to reach an agreement regarding a ‘fair’ redundancy policy.  This includes 
firstly discussing alternatives to job losses such as redeployment/relocation, 
minimising the number of losses, generous voluntary payments, career counselling 
and extensive notice period.  The mitigation of the pure efficiency decision is 
reflected by arrow D2 reflecting 50 voluntary redundancies.    The research revealed 
that moderation and mitigation appeared to be the dominant characteristics of 
decision-making under partnership.   While the ideal decision for the union may have 
been D3 (no job losses), partnership may enable a compromise to be struck.  
 
 
Voice 
Efficiency             Equity 
£1000 loyalty bonus 
Bonus system change 
Restructuring selection 
Discipline and grievance 
End of duvet days 
Performance 
management 
Restructuring 
Figure 4 – Countervailing forces at WebBank 
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• D1: 100 compulsory redundancies 
• D2: 50 voluntary redundancies 
• D3: no redundancies 
 
 
The framework can also be used to illustrate the dynamics of discipline and grievance 
at WebBank.  High turnover and discipline cases were highlighted by senior managers 
at WebBank to be a significant problem especially in the call centre environment.  A 
key area of involvement for the Forum was acting as an intermediary in disputes 
between employees and line managers.  A team manager recounted an incident 
involving a high performing employee who suddenly developed a poor attendance 
record.  It was believed that after several warnings an efficiency-oriented decision 
would need to be made to dismiss the employee.  The team manager admitted that he 
was slightly bewildered and disappointed by this, as the employee concerned was a 
consistently high performing member of staff, and therefore decided to ask a Web 
Bank People Forum representative to try and find out what was wrong.  It transpired 
that the employee had a poor relationship with her line manager, and believed that she 
had been the victim of bullying.  After investigation, the team manager transferred the 
employee to another team, and the employees attendance record improved 
significantly.  The team manager believed that had there been no opportunity for 
forum intervention a high performing employee would probably have been dismissed, 
D1              D2                                                      D3 
MODERATING 
VOICE 
EFFICIENCY                  EQUITY
Figure 5 – Moderating decisions at NatBank
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and the root of the problem never identified.  In other words, management may have 
dismissed the employee following several warnings, on the grounds that it was the 
most efficient decision (D1).  However, it was believed it was better to invest some 
time to ascertain the underlying cause and to try and resolve the situation.  This 
resulted in a decision which was both efficient for the organisation as a high 
performing was retained, but also more equitable for the worker, as she was able to air 
her grievance and did not lose her job as a result of a relationship breakdown (D2).  
Indeed, the ostensibly efficient decision (D1) may actually have been inefficient given 
that an experienced and popular employee may have been dismissed (Figure 7 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• D1: employee dismissed 
• D2: absenteeism resolved 
• D3: no action against the employee 
 
 
The same regulatory effect could not be identified in the case of BuSoc.  It was 
suggested that in the previous five years employment relations had generally been 
good with few major controversies.  The main recent incident was identified as the 
end of the final salary pension scheme to new entrants.  This has become a significant 
issue among mutual organisations, as spiralling pensions costs are seen to be eating 
into their ability to compete with their banking rivals.  Increasing subsidies for the 
D1              D2                                                      D3 
MODERATING 
VOICE 
EFFICIENCY                  EQUITY
Figure 6  – Moderating decisions at 
WebBank 
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funds is controversial as often the main beneficiaries are executives.  In 2001, the 
society took the decision to close the fund to new employees (D2).  A more drastic 
but efficient decision may have been D1 (close the scheme to all staff).  D3 represents 
a more equitable but less efficient approach of the employer increasing their 
contributions and lump some payments to help maintain the fund.  Yet there was little 
evidence of the decision being regulated by the union.  Indeed the decision was said to 
have been imposed without consultation.  So while the decision may have been D2 
(end final salary scheme to new members) and not perhaps the more drastic D1 which 
was the course of action taken by Kent Reliance and the Newbury Building Society at 
a similar time, there was little evidence of this being a result of union involvement.  
This is indicated by the dashed arrows in Figure 8.   In 2006, D2 remains the case 
although other organisations such as Clydesdale Bank and Co-operative Bank have 
recently opted for D1.  At BuSoc the union have since agreed to increases in 
employee contributions in return for lump sum payments by the employer, but the 
future of the pension fund remains uncertain and is still a significant concern for the 
union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• D1: Final salary pension scheme closed to all staff 
• D2: Final salary pension scheme closed to new staff 
• D3: No change to pension scheme 
 
 
 
EFFICIENCY                     EQUITY 
MODERATING? 
            D1          D2       D3
Figure 7 – Moderating decisions at BuSoc
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In other words, two of the cases demonstrated evidence of ‘partial success’ in many 
instances with the voice process appearing to ‘moderate’ decisions.  The same could 
not be said in the case of BuSoc, with the most important decision in recent years 
being made without consultation, and limited evidence to suggest that more positive 
decisions were actually the result of union engagement.  The Budd framework is 
therefore useful in illustrating how – and whether - voice moderated countervailing 
pressures between efficiency and equity.  However, an important caveat must be 
raised in relation to Budd’s call for ‘balance’: what exactly is meant by balancing the 
objectives of the employment relationship?  The phrase appears to suggest some kind 
of stable equilibrium and raises concerns therefore as to whether is actually 
achievable (Estreicher, 2005; Adams, 2005; Estreicher, 2005; Hyman, 2005).  It is not 
surprising that radical scholars such as Hyman are dismissive, as Budd acknowledges 
“critical industrial relations views the labour problem as inherent in capitalism and 
seeks to replace it with worker ownership and socialism” (p.103).  For pluralists, on 
the other hand, the ideas are highly attractive and provide a useful framework for 
analysis (Bamber, 2005).  However, it is proposed that balance may not right be the 
most appropriate term; indeed it is difficult to imagine what a balance of efficiency, 
equity and voice would look like in reality.  Adams (2005, 115) proposes a slightly 
modified objective, “optimality within minimally accepted bounds…societies should 
attempt to optimise efficiency, equity and voice – but the result might not be an equal 
weighting of all three objectives”.  In other words, the aim should be to achieve 
sufficient levels of voice and equity compatible with high levels of efficiency.  
Admittedly, Budd (2005) acknowledges such criticisms, and suggests that ‘balance’ 
need not necessarily be thought of as an equal weighting between the three 
components, but rather as “the search for arrangements that enhance one or more 
dimensions without undue sacrifices in other dimensions” (p.196), and that they can 
usefully be viewed more as a ‘regulative ideal’, even if it is never realised.  He 
comments that ‘respect’ could be an alternative term to ‘balance’, but suggests this 
creates a new question of how much respect is enough?  This study, however, prefers 
the use of the terms ‘accommodation’ or ‘moderation’ as it is believed that these are 
the most compatible with the pluralist view of the employment relationship, without 
implying that their ought to be an equal weighting which new pluralism cannot offer.   
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Overall, it is argued that the framework proposed by Budd is useful when exploring 
the subtle processes and outcomes of partnership.  Studies such as those by Kelly 
(2004) which rely on raw quantitative indicators such as the number of redundancies 
or pay differentials, overlook the qualitative aspects such as the way the process was 
handled, and clearly this is also of great importance to workers.  This echoes problems 
experienced in establishing a link between HRM and performance due to problems in 
establishing causality, inconsistency of HR practices applied, variations in the proxies 
used to measure high commitment HRM and performance, and the reliance on self 
reported scores from HR managers (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).  There is 
therefore evidence to support the arguments of Findlay and McKinlay (2003) that  it is 
from the process of partnership itself, i.e. the benefits of both influence over 
management and real involvement in governance processes, that employees may 
stand to gain from partnership.  This requires a broader, more holistic assessment of 
outcomes beyond narrow institutional union interests or raw labour outcomes. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
To conclude, it is suggested that different trajectories of experience are possible, and 
indeed likely.  There is also a need to re-think exactly what partnership means, and 
what it is expected to achieve and assess accordingly.  The paper has also 
demonstrated the value of exploring the process of partnership as well outcomes, and 
Budd (2004) offers a useful analytical framework for doing this.  There is also a need 
to compare the actual outcomes in real contexts of decision making shaped by 
partnership, and to compare outcomes not just with the ‘ideal’ outcome, but with the 
other possible alternatives.  As these cases demonstrate, several decisions were better 
than they could otherwise have been for staff, and the partnership approach had 
resulted in several compromises to the benefit of employees by mitigating the impact 
of decisions. There was evidence to suggest that without the partnership dialogue 
decisions may have been more focused on short-term efficiency, with scant regard for 
the equity outcomes.  Interestingly management acknowledged that decisions based 
solely on ‘profit-maximising’ and ‘efficiency’ are often inefficient because they are 
met with staff resistance and union opposition, whereas compromises which may 
appear to be less efficient and slower are actually moreso because of greater 
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legitimacy and acceptability.  In other words, managers suggested that often there was 
a sound business case for equity.  Partnership is unlikely to ‘balance’ the objectives of 
the employment relationship, but it is quite possible that the outcomes were more 
balanced than they would have otherwise been, and indeed it is difficult to imagine 
what a balance would actually look like.  Partnership may not led to the development 
of three perfectly stakeholder-oriented organisations, but rather three organisations 
which were more stakeholder-oriented than they may otherwise have been.  When 
evaluated in this light, partnership can be seen as delivering more than a modicum of 
success. 
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